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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, t 
Petitioner-Appellant, : Case No. 20562 
v • : 
RAYMOND JEFFREY JOHNSON, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant petitioned this Court for rehearing of an 
opinion filed by this Court on June 30, 1987. In the opinion 
authored by Justice Stewart, defendant's conviction of aggravated 
robbery and aggravated assault was affirmed and his conviction of 
theft was reversed. Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable 
Leonard H. Russon, Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, to five years to life for the aggravated robbery, and 
zero to five years for the aggravated assault. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Respondent 
(Respondents' Brief at 2-7) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court in its opinion clearly recognized and 
addressed defendant's argument that insufficient evidence existed 
to convict him of aggravated assault. In finding tftat sutficient 
evidence existed for the jury to conclude that defendant either 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
committed an aggravated assault or aided or abetted another in 
the commission of the offense, this Court did not overlook any 
material facts or principles of law* 
Defendant has cited no new facts or law in his petition 
for rehearing other than testimony by the victims which has 
already been addressed by the State and this Court in its 
opinion, and statements by the prosecutor which clearly was not 
evidence in the case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT J 
THIS COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
DEFENDANT EITHER COMMITTED OR AIDED OR 
ABETTED ANOTHER IN THE COMMISSION OF AN 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
In his petition for rehearing defendant claims that he 
was improperly convicted of aggravated assault because 
insufficient evidence existed to show that he either directly 
committed the offense or aided or abetted another in the 
commission of the offense. 
in Prcwn v» PicKarflf denying reh'qr 4 Utah 292, 11 p. 
512 (1886), this Court set forth the standard for determining 
whether a petition for rehearing should be granted: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court 
failed to consider some material point in the 
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or 
that some matter has been discovered which 
was unknown at the time of the hearing. 
4 Utah at 294, 11 P. at 512 (citation omitted). In Cumminas v. 
Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913), this Court stated: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
discourage the practice of filing petitions 
for rehearings in proper cases. When this 
court, however, has considered and decided 
all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, 
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked 
some material fact or facts, or have 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the 
result. . . . If there are some reasons, 
however, such as we have indicated above, or 
other good reasons, a petition for a 
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it 
is meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624. 
In the opinion authored by Justice Stewart, State v. 
Johnson. 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah, June 30, 1987), (Appendix A) 
the Court attirmed defendant's conviction after a full and fair 
consideration of defendant's arguments on appeal. The Court 
clearly recognized tnat defendant's contention that insufficient 
evidence existed to convict him ot aggravated assault was without 
merit. 
Even assuming that there is no evidence that 
Johnson personally committed the aggravated 
assault, Johnson's argument is untenable . . 
. . Since Johnson essentially concedes that 
he had the intent to participate with the 
others in the aggravated robbery, and since 
there is sufficient evidence that Johnson was 
one of the two men in the jewelry store at 
the time of the robbery, Johnson was 
responsible for the aggravated assault, 
either as a principal or an aider and abetter 
under [Utah Code Ann.] S 76-2-202. The 
evidence shows that both men participated in 
forcing the customer to the back bathroom and 
that one ot the men used a gun. Under these 
facts, the man who did not use a gun 
nonetheless encouraged and aided the other to 
commit the aggravated assault. 
60 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32. 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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It is clear from a review of defendant's briet, his 
petition for rehearingf and the Court's opinion, that defendant 
does not meet the necessary requirements to grant a petition for 
rehearing. Under Cummings, this Court should grant a petition 
for rehearing only if it finds that it overlooked or misconstrued 
any material facts, statute or other principle of law applicable 
in the case. 
Defendant's petition for rehearing is substantially the 
same argument he raised in his brief on appeal. In his petition 
for rehearing, defendant makes reference to two items in the 
record not initially cited in his brief. First, defendant cites 
to testimony by the two victims that defendant was not in the 
store. This additional cite to the record provides nothing new 
to his argument. Acknowledging the testimony by the victims, the 
State nonetheless argued in its responsive brief that three 
witnesses outside of the store observed defendant and another man 
leaving the jewelry store carrying a full plastic garbage bag and 
entering a car which sped away as they entered (Br. of Resp. at 
21-22, R. 1088, 1139, 1192). Additionally, the State argued on 
direct appeal that neither victim obtained a good look at the 
perpetrator because of his demand that the victims not look at 
his face (Br. ot Resp. at 22, R. 643, 1221). Apparently this 
Court adopted the State's argument since it found that "there is 
sufficient evidence that Johnson was one of the two men in the 
jewelry store at the time of the robbery. . . " Johnson 60 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 32. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Second, defendant cites to the prosecutor's opening 
statements describing the anticipated testimony of the victims as 
evidence that neither victim recognized defendant as the 
perpetrator. It is well recognized that the purpose of an 
opening statement is to outline the issues of the trial for the 
jury and is not admissible evidence for the jury to consider. 
State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365f , 120 P.2d 285, 313 (1941). 
Additionally, the prosecutor in the instant case told the jury 
that statements by attorneys in the case were not evidence and 
that the only evidence to be considered by the jury was that 
which would be introduced during the trial in the form of 
exhibits and testimony (R. 589, 1628). Furthermore, it appears 
from the prosecutor's statements that the Judge also advised the 
jury tnat statements by attorneys were not to be considered as 
evidence. 
The Court has told you that what the 
attorneys say in either asking the questions 
ot the witnesses or in arguing the case to 
you, or to the Court, is not evidence and 
none of us attorneys expect you to accept 
what we tell you as evidence. 
You have heard the evidence. The Court has 
instructed you to base your deliberations on 
the evidence, and not on what I may say or 
what any of the other lawyers may say, or not 
on what you may have heard in connection with 
other cases, or heard out of this courtroom 
in connection with this case. 
(R. 589, 1628). Defendant has cited no new facts in the record 
or principle of law overlooked by this Court. All defendant has 
done in his petition for rehearing is provide testimony by the 
victims which was already addressed by the State and this Court 
-5-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
on direct appeal, and statements by the prosecutor which the jury 
was informed not to consider as evidence in the case. Just as 
this Court pointed out in its opinion, even assuming that no 
evidence exists that defendant personally committed the 
aggravated assault, nonetheless he conceded that he had the 
intent to participate with the others in the aggravated robbery 
and thus was responsible for the aggravated assault either as a 
principal or an aider and abetter. It is clear from this Court's 
opinion that it considered all material facts and principles of 
law and found defendant's argument to be without merit. Because 
defendant cites no new facts in the record or principle of law 
overlooked by this Court, the State requests this Court to deny 
the petition for rehearing based upon the well-reasoned opinion 
already rendered by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
petition for rehearing should be denied and his conviction 
affirmed. 
DATED this / ^ day of November, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
t!*j6«£ <=>?. ^y^^f 
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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of rescission or of an tccord and satisfaction 
of the entire Agreement was ever made and 
accepted. The October, 1980 letters merely 
disputed the time when the payments were to 
be made and did not contain an offer or state 
the purpose or intent of the early repayment. 
The May 22, 1981 letter of transmittal 
stated, 'Since the full repayment of this loan 
is the final matter to be taken care of in 
regard to the Gold-Spor Company matters 
with Crested Butte, I have prepared and enc-
losed a Receipt and Release for signature by 
Crested Butte.* That attempt to foreclose 
Crested Butte from its rights under the cont-
ract was made only after the Spors had made 
full payment on the loan. Indeed, the letter 
began, "1 have been informed ... that the Gold-
Spor loan has now been paid in full/ This 
after-the-fact, unilateral effort by the Spors 
does not satisfy the requirements for either a 
mutual rescission or an accord and satisfac-
tion. 
The wording of the 'receipt and release0 
also supports Crested Butte's claim. Although 
the 'receipt and release" contemplated a 
complete rescission of the Agreement, the 
•receipt and release,* as well as the letter of 
transmittal which accompanied it, expressly 
required the signature of Crested Butte before 
the document could become effective. The 
stated consideration for the 'receipt and 
release* was the mutual release of the obliga-
tions created by the Agreement and not just 
the prepayment of the loan. Repayment of the 
loan was only one, independent obligation 
created by the Agreement. Nowhere in the 
'receipt and release' is prepayment of the loan 
referred to as the final performance to be 
rendered by either party pursuant to the Agr-
eement. Thus, consistent with Crested Butte's 
version of the facts, the sending of the 
'receipt and release* may have simply been 
the first offer of final settlement after the full 
repayment of the loan. 
Because disputed material factual issues 
existed concerning the purpose of the early 
repayment of the loan, the trial court inappr-
opriately drew inferences as to the parties* 
intent in deciding the issue on summary jud-
gment. That may not be done in resolving a 
motion for summary judgment. U'.M. BMJDCS 
Co. v. Sohio NMturtl Resources Co., 627 P.2d 
56,59 (Utah 1981). 
Reversed and remanded for further proce-
edings. Costs to appellants. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
• Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
• Leonard H. Ruison, District Judge 
Zimmerman, Justice, having 
disqualified himself, does not participate 
herein, Russon, District Judge, sat. 
1. 'The Sport* means the individual and corporate 
plaintiffs combined or in separate capacities, but 
does not represent Cold Spor Mining Company. 
Otr as 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondeat, 
Raymond Jeffrey JOHNSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20562 
FILED: Jane 30,1W7 
THIRD DISTRICT 
Leonard H. Russon 
ATTORNEYS: 
David L. Wilkinson, KimbeTly JC. Hornak, 
Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
STEWART, Associate Chief Jnstke: 
Defendant Johnson was convicted of aggr-
avated robbery, aggravated assault, and theft. 
Johnson appeals, seeking reversal of his con-
viction and a new trial. Four issues are pres-
ented on appeal: (1) whether the search of 
Johnson's automobile went beyond the cons-
titutional scope of an inventory search, (2) 
whether there was sufficient evidence with 
which to convict Johnson of aggravated 
assault, (3) whether a jury instruction regar-
ding the possession of stolen property uncon-
stitutionally shifted the burden of proof to 
Johnson, and (4) whether, under the circum-
stances of this case, theft is a lesser included 
offense of aggravated robbery. We affirm in 
part and reverse the theft conviction. 
The evidence, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury veTdict, shows that on 
August 18, 1984, Johnson and a male acco-
mplice entered Oak wood Jewelry in Salt Lake 
County. The first to enter forced the lone sales 
derk at gun point into a bathroom in the back 
of the store. While one of the men was colle-
cting jewelry, a female customer entered the 
store. The customer was forced to the rear of 
the store by one man, and the other man 
forced her at gun point into the bathroom 
with the sales clerk. The sales derk and the 
customer were repeatedly told not to look at 
the face of either Johnson or his accomplice. 
Shortly thereafter witnesses observed Johnson 
and another man outside Oak wood Jewelers 
9m tmmpku Utan C+44 Annotations, enaanh CndtaCo's Annotation Srrvfct 
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walking very quickly and carrying a large 
garbage bag with imall object* bulging from 
the bag. Johnson was positively identified by 
these witnesses at trial. Moreover, the witne-
sses testified that another man and a woman 
were waiting in an automobile which had the 
enfine running, the man in the driver's seat 
and the woman in the front passenger seat, 
and that Johnson and his accomplice hurriedly 
got into the back seat and the car sped away. 
Johnson's automobile was identified as the 
automobile in which the individuals left. 
On August 24, 1984, two officers from the 
Los Angeles Police Department on routine 
patrol at the Pink Motel in Los Angeles obs-
erved Johnson in his automobile in the 
parking lot operating illegal hydraulic lifts. 
The officers also observed a woman, Jeanna 
Salaznr, walk out of Room 10 of the Pink 
Motel and get into the automobile with 
Johnson. Salaiar appeared to be under the 
influence of an opiate. The officers also obs-
erved two other individuals, Johnson's 
brother and his girlfriend, in Room 10 admi-
nistering drugs to themselves. 
Soon after Salazar got into the car with 
Johnson, the two started to leave. Johnson's 
brother and bis girlfriend approached the car 
at about the same time that the police officers 
stopped the car and observed marijuana inside 
in plain view. They also observed track marks 
on the insides of the individuals' arms and 
placed all four under arrest for being under 
the influence of a controlled substance. 
A .38 caliber revolver and a substantial 
amount of jewelry were recovered from Room 
10 of the Pink Motel. The officers also found 
jewelry on the suspects and .38 caliber amm-
unition in the purse of one of the suspects. 
Johnson's car was impounded and an inven-
tory search was conducted in compliance with 
the Los Angeles Police Department automo-
bile inventory checklist. Under the hood, the 
officers found jewelry wrapped in a Pink 
Motel towel, and in the trunk, they found a 
small unlocked box labeled 'Oakwood Jewelry 
Inc., Salt Lake City.' An officer opened the 
box and found over one thousand precious 
gems. The jewelry waj subsequently identified 
as the jewelry taken from Oak wood Jewelers. 
I. 
The fust issue is whether the search of 
defendant's automobile went beyond the leg-
itimate scope of an inventory search. An inv-
entory search of an automobile is a well-
defined exception to the warrant requirement 
of the Fourth Amendment. See South Dskou 
r. Oppernum. 428 U.S. 364, 367-76(1976); Sute 
r. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 126 (Utah 1983). 
In Oppermsn, three purposes of an inventory 
•earch were outlined: (1) to protect an owner's 
property while it is in the custody of police; 
(2) to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or 
vandalized property; and (3) to protect police 
officers from danger. Oppcrmao, 428 U.S. at 
369. 
Johnson contends that the search of bis car 
was not a true inventory search but wis an 
investigatory search because the officers' 
detail was only a burglary detail and because 
they were not really concerned with Johnson's 
using hydraulic lifts. He relies on United 
Ststes v. HcUmtn, 556 F.2d 442, 443-44 (9th 
Cir. 1977), which held that impounding • 
vehicle for the purpose of a warrantless search 
and not for a legitimate inventory violates the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The impoundment and subsequent inventory 
search of Johnson's car were conducted after 
Johnson and his friends were lawfully arrested 
for being under the influence of a controlled 
substance. Clearly, the officers were not req-
uired to ignore drug-related violations simply 
because they were on a burglary detail. 
Johnson also contends that the inventory 
search was investigatory because the police 
made no determination whether the automo-
bile could remain in the rootd driveway or 
parking lot while Johnson was being booked. 
The argument is not persuasive. Colorado r. 
Bcrtine, 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987), held that alth-
ough the police could have offered the defe-
ndant the opportunity to make other arrang-
ements for the safekeeping of his property, 
their failure to do so did not eliminate the 
justification for taking an inventory of the 
defendant's property. In Bertioe, the defen-
dant's van was impounded by police after the 
arrest. A back-up police officer inventoried 
the defendant's van in accordance with local 
police procedures. The officer found a back-
pack behind the front seat and, inside the 
pack, a nylon bag containing metal canisters. 
The officer opened the canisters and discov-
ered that they contained cocaine, methaqu*-
lone tablets, cocaine paraphernalia, and $700 
in cash. The officer further found $210 in a 
sealed envelope inside the backpack. Id. at 
740. The Court held that even though givinj 
the defendant an 'opportunity to make alter-
native arrangements would undoubtedly have 
been possible ... 'the real question is not what 
could have been achieved but whether the 
Fourth Amendment requires such steps." Id. 
at 742 (quoting Illinois v. La/ayettr, 462 U.S. 
640, 647 (J983)) (emphasis in Lafayette). The 
interest the police had in protecting themselves 
and the lot owners against false claims of theft 
was sufficient under the Fourth Amendment 
to justify taking an inventory of the contents 
of the backpack. The same justifications apply 
to the facts of this case. 
Furthermore, the existence or absence of 
justification for the impoundment of an aut-
omobile may be determined from the surrou-
nding drcumsunces. Sute v. Rice, 717 P.2d 
695, 696 (Utah 1986); Sute r. Hygh, 711 P.2d 
264, 268 (Utah 1985). At the time of the 
arrests, Johnson's car was parked in the 
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middle of a motel parking lot, blocking 
traffic. The car had art out-of-town temp-
orary sticker in lieu of license plates. Johnson 
did not have a driver's license, and his friends 
were under the influence of a controlled sub-
stance and were under arrest; neither Johnson 
nor his friends could properly have moved the 
vehicle. 
Johnson next asserts that the police officers 
were unjustified in inventorying under the 
hood and in the locked trunk. In Berune, the 
Court stated that 'reasonable police regulat-
ions relating to inventory procedures admini-
stered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Ame-
ndment.* 107 S. Ct. at 742. In addition, the 
Court wrote, "When a legitimate search is 
under way, and when its purpose and its limits 
have been precisely defined, nice distinctions 
between ... glove compartments, upholstered 
seats, trunks, and wrapped packages ... must 
give way to the interest in the prompt and 
efficient completion of the task at hand." Id. 
at 743 (quoting United Sutes v. Ross, 456 
U.S. 798,821 (1982)). 
The search in this case was conducted acc-
ording to an inventory checklist mandated by 
the Los Angeles Police Department for ail 
impounded vehicles. The areas in the trunk 
and under the hood are included on an inve-
ntory check list so that vaJuable items that 
may be in the trunk or under the hood are 
accounted for and so that the condition of 
items such as the spare tire, the battery, and 
other equipment can be determined. There is 
DO showing that the Los Angeles police offi-
cers acted in bad faith by conducting an inv-
entory search as a pretense for conducting an 
illegal warrantless search. See Hygh, 711 P.2d 
264. The officers were justified in searching 
the trunk, its contents, and under the hood 
and in opening the unlocked jewelry box 
found in the trunk and unwrapping the towel 
found under the hood. Berune, 107 S. Ct. at 
743; OppcnnMn, 428 U.S. at 364; Sute v. 
Ear/. 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986). 
Finally, Johnson contends that since the 
police did not know the jewelry was connected 
with a robbery in Salt Lake City, the seizure J 
of the jewelry and the subsequent investigation 
to determine whether it was stolen were unla-
wful. The point is without merit. The large 
amount of jewelry, some located under the 
bood wrapped in a towel, some found in a 
box labeled * Oak wood Jewelers. Inc., Salt 
Lake City/ and some found in Room 10 of 
the Pink Motel, was sufficient to give rise to a 
strong belief that the jewels were stolen. Since 
the jewels were in the lawful custody of the 
police, DO warrant was necessary. 
n. 
Johnson next claims that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to convict him of an aggravated 
assault on the customer who was in Oakwood 
Jewelers during the robbery. He does not 
challenge, however, his conviction for aggra-
vated robbery of the jewelry store. His cont-
ention is only that it was one of the other 
participants in the robbery who committed the 
aggravated assault. He argues that despite his 
conviction of aggravated robbery, be did not 
have the specific intent to commit an aggrav-
ated assault and, therefore, this conviction was 
in error. 
Even assuming that there is no evidence that 
Johnson personally committed the aggravated 
assault, Johnson's argument is untenable. 
Utah Code Ann. f 76*2-202 (1978) prov-
ides as follows: 
Every person, acting with the 
mental state required for the com-
mission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes 
an offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct. 
Since Johnson essentially concedes that he had 
the intent to participate with the others in the 
aggravated robbery, and since there is suffic-
ient evidence that Johnson was one of the two 
men in the jewelry store at the time of the 
robbery, Johnson was responsible for the 
aggravated assault, either as a principal or an 
aider and abetter under ( 76-2-202. The 
evidence shows that both men participated in 
forcing the customer to the back bathroom 
and that one of the men used a gun. Under 
these facts, the man who did not use a gun 
nonetheless encouraged and aided the other to 
commit the aggravated assault. 
m. 
The third issue is whether a jury instruction 
regarding the possession of stolen property 
unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof 
to Johnson. See StMte v. TMTMTM, 720 P.2d 
1368 (Utah 1986); Sute v. pMcheco, 712 P.2d 
192 (Utah 1985); StMte v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 
321 (Utah 1985). Section 76-6-402(1) (1978) 
sutes: 'Possession of property recently stolen, 
when no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be deemed prima 
facie evidence that the person in possession 
stole the property/ If the trial court had ins-
tructed in the language of the statute, it would 
have encd. Frtntis v. FrinkUn, 471 U.S. 307 
(1985); StMte v. Chambers, aupra. But the 
court did not so instruct. Rather, the trial 
court instructed the jury as follows: 'Under 
the law of the Sute of Utah, possession of 
property recently stolen, when a person in 
possession fails to make a satisfactory expla-
nation of such possession, is a fact from 
which you may infer that the person in poss-
ession stole such property.* This instruction 
was not defective. Sute v. Smith, 726 P.2d 
1232 (Utah 1986). 
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Johnson also contends that the instruction 
failed to correctly state the presumption arti-
cutated in | 76-6-402(1) and that the use 
of the word "fails* instead of the statutory 
language #no* misdirected the jury. The arg-
ument is frivolous, as is the contention that 
the term *may infer* is stronger than the sta-
tutory language of a presumption which would 
be 'deemed prima facie.* 
IV. 
Finally, Johnson contends that his convic-
tion for theft should be reversed because, 
under the facts of this case, theft was a lesser 
included offense of the aggravated robbery 
charge. On this point, defendant is correct. 
Sure v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983). squa-
rely holds that to be the law. 
The convictions are affirmed except for the 
theft conviction, which is reversed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Cordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Zim»eraaa, Jastke: (Coacvrrlng) 
I join the majority in concluding that under 
relevant United States Supreme Court decis-
ions, the inventory search conducted here was 
permissible. 
However, I would specifically note that the 
defendant has not challenged this search under 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
As I noted in my separate opinion in State v. 
Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-72 (Utah 1985) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring), much of the 
existing federal fourth amendment warrantless 
search and seizure law is rather Kafkaesque, 
consisting as it does of 
rules built upon a series of contra-
dictory and confusing rationalizat-
ions and distinctions. Police officers 
and judges attempting to make their 
way through this labyrinth often 
imperil both the rights of individ-
uals and the integrity in effective-
ness of law enforcement. 
Id. at 272. Nothing has occurred within the 
almost two years since Hygh to dissuade ne 
from this view. And I include within the sweep 
of this condemnation the rules governing 
warrantless automobile searches, such as occ-
urred in the present case. The notion that 
anything on wheels can be searched by an 
officer who, after the fact, can offer some 
reasonable justification for having done so 
essentially guts the fourth amend-
ment's warrant requirement as it 
pertains to automobile searches. 
There is tittle reason to believe that 
effective law enforcement requires 
this sacrifice of interests protected 
by the warrant requirement. 
Id. 272 n.l (citations omitted). Were this case 
argued as state constitutional grounds, I might 
well find the search unlawful. 
1 join the majority in rejecting the remai-
nder of the defendant's contentions. The 
conviction is appropriately affirmed. 
Durham, Justice, concurs in the 
concurring opinion of Justice Zimroerraaa. 
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STEWART, Associate Chief Jastke: 
Danny Richards appeals a judgment entered 
against him for assault, a class B misdeme-
anor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. { 76-
5-102 (1978). The trial court sentenced Ric-
hards to the maximum term of six months in 
the Salt Lake County jail and refused to give 
him credit for seventy-five days of present-
ence incarceration he served because of his 
inability to post bail. The issue he raises is 
whether he was denied equal protection of the 
law by the trial court's refusal to credit his 
sentence with his presentence incarceration 
time. 
On December 15, 1984, Richards was arre-
sted and charged with aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony. Utah Code Ann. | 76-5-
103 (1978). Although his motion to reduce bail 
was granted, he was still unable to post bail, 
and he remained in jail from the date of his 
arrest until his sentencing. On February 28, 
1985, Richards pleaded guilty to simple 
assault. Eight days later, on March 8, 1985, he 
was sentenced to the maximum jail term 
allowed and ordered to make restitution. After 
sentencing, Richards asked the trial court to 
credit his presentence incarceration time 
against his six-month term. The trial judge 
granted credit for the eight days between the 
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